In Stig Hjarvard’s characterization, mediatization studies move beyond the positivist origins of the social sciences, as they must in order to avoid the fundamental contradiction between original commitments to classical determinism vis-à-vis human agency as acknowledged within mediatization studies. In order to sustain and enhance Hjarvard’s vision of the coherence between human agency and mediatization studies as a species of social science, I first sharpen these theoretical tensions by developing a robust account of human freedom as informed by Kant and (...) virtue ethics. I then adopt precise understandings of complementarity and epistemological pluralism as initially developed in Quantum Mechanics and subsequently by Karen Barad and Judith Simon as frameworks that can coherently conjoin contemporary social science with strong accounts of human freedom. The resulting coherency—or entanglement—between ethics and science implies new ethical responsibilities for social scientists as ‘virtuous agents’. (shrink)

This study provides a comparison of thinking style and ethical decision-making patterns between 386 U.S. students and 506 students from the People’s Republic of China enrolled in undergraduate business education in their respective countries. Contrary to our expectations, the Chinese students demonstrated a significantly greater linear thinking style compared to American students. As hypothesized, both Chinese and U.S. students possessing a balanced linear and nonlinear thinking style profile demonstrated greater ethical intent across a series of ethics vignettes. Chinese students also (...) were more likely to adopt an act utilitarian rationale, an ethical philosophy that in practice may violate government regulations or social rules to benefit one’s family instead of society for explaining their decisions across the vignettes. We conclude with a discussion of important theoretical as well as practical and potential future implications based on this comparative study. (shrink)

What if you were to discover that you were only one half of a whole—that you had a divine double? In the second and third centuries CE, Charles Stang shows, this idea gripped the religious imagination of the Eastern Mediterranean, offering a distinctive understanding of the self that has survived in various forms down to the present.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new collaboration between the Association of Internet Researchers and the Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses historical, comparative and ethics-based approaches. Findings The collaboration is catalyzed by central interests shared between AoIR and JICES, namely, in the ethical and social impacts of the internet. The collaboration accordingly aims to bring research and reflection developed for the AoIR conferences to the JICES’ readership. Originality/value The value (...) of this collaboration is considerable, as it promises extensive new cross-fertilization between the two communities. The viewpoint begins with a brief overview of the collaboration’s initiation by Prof Simon Rogerson and its logistics over the next two years. Following a general review of Information and Computing Ethics and Intercultural Information Ethics, an overview of ethical considerations fostered by AoIR is offered, focusing on the development of internet research ethics, especially its most recent expression in an IRE 3.0. (shrink)

The summa of a distinguished philosopher's career, and full treatment of the temporal in philosophical terms, this volume shows us that by taking time seriously we can discover something essential to almost every question of human concern. Are we IN time? Charles Sherover asks, and in pursuing this question he considers time in conjunction with cognition, morality, action, physical nature, being, God, freedom, and politics. His essays, while drawing upon Royce, Heidegger, Kant, Leibniz, and even Hartshorne and Bergson, defy (...) categorization by method or school; instead, they reveal the diversity and divergence of thinking about time as well as the myriad features and values within the omnipresence of time and change. The volume begins with an overview of the history of thought on time and a clarification of some fundamental conceptual distinctions in temporal ideas. Sherover then offers a critique of Kant, the first thinker to recognize that all human experience has a temporal form. In a series of essays on metaphysics--a valuable corrective to the dominant metaphysical tradition of talking about being as if time does not matter--he pursues temporal responses to such problems as being, internal relations, individuation, mind, and free will. Finally, in essays on time, freedom, and the common good, Sherover argues that these three phenomena are intrinsically related to one another, the fulfillment of each involving the other two. Throughout, these essays brilliantly depict human life and thought thoroughly steeped in time and argue for the significance of the future for human activity. Portraying the openness of the future as the basis for purposiveness and freedom, knowledge and moral action, social life and religious hope, Sherover's work conveys a hopeful message of human finitude that nonetheless allows us a measure of control over events in our own time. (shrink)

This investigation examines several key factors believed to promote human flourishing, specifically: Factor 1: Age, Education, & Healthcare, Factor 2: Labor Force Participation, Factor 3: Crime, Factor 4: Income, Factor 5: Youth Unemployment and Factor 6: Voting Behavior. Data was examined at the county level, and collected from a variety of US government and non-governmental organizations. Our investigation into the conditions necessary to promote human flourishing uses internal migration within the United States as the indicator of “unhappy” communities. The findings (...) reveal that all factors are important in emigration somewhere, but the factors vary for different counties. As a result, attempts to address the ills of society require an appreciation of geography and context. (shrink)

We develop an approach to the longstanding conjecture of Kierstead concerning the character of strongly nontrivial automorphisms of computable linear orderings. Our main result is that for any η-like computable linear ordering, such that has no interval of order type η, and such that the order type of is determined by a -limitwise monotonic maximal block function, there exists computable such that has no nontrivial automorphism.

In this dissertation, I critically examine the philosophy of transcendental empiricism. Transcendental empiricism is, among other things, a philosophy of mental content. It attempts to dissolve an epistemological dilemma of mental content by splitting the difference between two diametrically opposed accounts of content. John McDowell's minimal empiricism and Richard Gaskin's minimalist empiricism are two versions of transcendental empiricism. Transcendental empiricism itself originates with McDowell's work. This dissertation is divided into five parts. First, in the Introduction, I state the Wittgensteinian metaphilosophical (...) orientation of transcendental empiricism. This metaphilosophical approach provides a plateau upon which much of the rest of this work may be examined. Second, I offer a detailed description of McDowell’s minimal empiricism. Third, I critique Gaskin's critique and modification of McDowell's minimal empiricism. I argue that (1) Gaskin's critiques are faulty and that (2) Gaskin's minimalist empiricism is very dubious. Fourth, I scrutinize the alleged credentials of McDowell's minimal empiricism. I argue that McDowell's version of linguistic idealism is problematic. I then comment on a recent dialogue between transcendental empiricism and Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenology. The dialogue culminates with Dreyfus's accusation of the “Myth of the Mental.” I argue that this accusation is correct in which case McDowell's direct realism is problematic. I conclude that minimal empiricism does not dissolve the dilemma of mental content. Finally, I argue that Tyler Burge successfully undermines the doctrine of disjunctivism, but disjunctivism is crucial for transcendental empiricism. Ultimately, however, I aim to show that transcendental empiricism is an attractive alternative to philosophies of mental content. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean EthicsCharles M. YoungGabriel Richardson Lear. Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. ix + 238. Cloth, $35.00.Suppose that you and I are friends. I need a ride to the airport; you offer to take me. You might do this for any of a number of reasons: (...) because you want to place me in your debt, because you want to impress bystanders, etc. But you might also do it for none of these reasons. You might do it, instead, because, understanding what resources are and what resources are for, you see taking me to the airport as an appropriate use of your resources (your time and your car), given our relationship and the circumstances in which we find ourselves.That's the Readers' Digest version of one story one might tell, on Aristotle's behalf, by way of connecting up friendship, virtuous action, practical and theoretical wisdom, action for its own sake, and action for the sake of the fine in the Nicomachean Ethics. I myself think it is a good story. It is also a story, I think, that Gabriel Richardson Lear tells, at least some of the time, in Happy Lives and the Highest Good, though she tells it with respect to courage, temperance, and magnanimity, not liberality and friendship.Most of the time, however, Lear tells another story. According to it, your taking me to the airport makes clear your commitment to make use of your resources to promote my good. Since we are friends, however, my good is bound up with yours, so in promoting my good you also promote your own good. But according to Aristotle the good for each of us is a life in which rationality is realized in thought and action. Hence your taking me to the airport counts as fine because it shows your commitment to that sort of life. But, again according to Aristotle, the centerpiece, and source of value, of that sort of life is contemplative activity, so you act for the sake of contemplation, whether you know this or not. And, in view of its expression of practical reason and truthfulness, your liberal activity is structurally similar to and so approximates to contemplative activity, and this allows us to say that you did what you did for the sake of contemplation.This is, so far as I know, an entirely new approach to the problems raised by Aristotle's identification of happiness with contemplation in NE X. Lear's story, and the arguments in its support, deserve and will repay serious attention. I limit myself here to four concerns about some of the details.First, our first story locates what is fine about virtuous action in the fit exhibited among the agent, her action, and her situation. Lear's story locates what is fine about virtuous action in its promotion of a certain kind of life. The first story thus sees what is fine about [End Page 118] virtuous action as something intrinsic to it, while Lear's story sees it as something external to it that it promotes. The first story seems to me to be looking in the right place.Second, the first story has it that virtuous activity is an expression of understanding, Lear's story that it is an expression of a commitment to understanding. Again, the first story seems to me to be looking in the right place.Third, Lear thinks that the liberal person can be said to act for the sake of contemplation when contemplation is the source of value for what she does, even when it is not the conscious aspiration of her action. That may be true, but I do not see that it is enough. What needs explanation is rather that she can be said to choose liberal activity for the sake of contemplation, and it is unclear how this could be unconscious.Finally, Lear's appeal to approximation may prove too much. The crafts, according to Aristotle, involve practical reason and truthfulness. But Aristotle doesn't believe that craft... (shrink)

La différance comme déconstruction de la violence examine "la différance", une singularité de Jacques Derrida. L'auteur est profondément fidèle à l'esprit derridien en réaffirmant que la différance n'est ni un mot ni un concept mais un jeu littéraire qui porte des traces philosophiques et qui exige également des lecteurs de respecter le pouvoir du silence textuel. Même si la différance interroge la violence sous diverses formes, elle attirera principalement notre attention sur la violence "inaudible" de toutes nos structures. Le présent (...) ouvrage interroge sur le jeu de la différance. Avec la différance, Derrida nous invite à nous asseoir devant un silence absolu du texte, devant une impossibilité. Ainsi, les déconstructeurs sont appelés à jouer une possibilité de l'impossibilité. Deux autres volumes suivent ce livre ; l'un étudie la trace de la différance, l'autre étudie le silence de la différance. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Courage and Self‐control The Object of Cheer Danger as the Object of Cheer Safety as the Object of Cheer Success as the Object of Cheer Horatius at the Bridge Acting for the Sake of the Fine When is Death Fine? Note Bibliography.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Preliminaries Universal vs. Particular Justice The Scope of Particular Justice Justice and the Doctrine of the Mean: The Problem Distributive and Corrective Justice Political Justice Pleonexia Justice and the Doctrine of the Mean: Aristotle's Solution Conclusion Bibliography.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Preliminaries Apology 21b9–23c1: The Origins of the Socratic Elenchus Inconsistency Does Socrates Cheat? Some Stabs at Explanations Concluding Remarks Note.

Plato's striking figure of the ‘child in us’ at Phaedo 77e5 takes on an added lustre when viewed in the light of the theory of explanation Socrates develops between lOObl and 105c7.Socrates' theory aims to explain why certain objects have certain properties: why something is beautiful or tall, or when a body will be sick or alive. Explanation is called for, Socrates thinks, when an object has a property its title to which is insecure, in the sense that the object's (...) having the property is not guaranteed by its being what it is. Thus Socrates wants an explanation, for example, of a person's being tall or – the case of especial interest in the Phaedo – of a body's being alive. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

First published in 1975 and still without equal, The Human Experience of Time provides a thorough review of the concept of time in the Western philosophic tradition. Encompassing a wide range of writings, from the Book of Genesis and the classical thinkers to the work of such twentieth-century philosophers as Collingwood and McKeon, all with introductory essays by the editor, this classic anthology offers a synoptic view of the changing philosophic notions of time.

Shortly after X-ray technology was discovered, it was utilized in war medicine. In this paper, the authors consider how the challenging context of war created fertile conditions for learning, as early radiologists were forced to find solutions to the unique problems posed during wartime. The “battlefield” became the “classroom” where radiologists constructed knowledge in X-ray instrumentation, methods, and education, as well as in medicine generally. Through an examination of two broad historical wartime examples, the authors illustrate how X-rays were used (...) as part of war medicine and offer a detailed sketch of instances of knowledge construction in war radiology. With a sociology of knowledge perspective, they conclude that the knowledge generated in war belongs also to civilian medicine. An understanding of war radiology’s role as a “springboard” for knowledge construction is thus crucial for a complete understanding of the history of radiology. (shrink)

In certain philosophical quarters, a new metaphilosophical position is being discussed—antiphilosophy. Such a position seems to maintain that there is no distinction between philosophy and sophistry, reason and rhetoric, arguing and emoting. This paper examines antiphilosophy. Specifically, it aims to address three interrelated questions: Is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? The paper argues that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to reconstruct philosophical discourse on (...) noncognitive lines. Explicitly, “to assert” and the belief propositional attitude is replaced by “to convince” and a pro‐attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. The paper examines one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:William Thomas Jones 1910–1998Charles M. YoungWilliam Thomas Jones, a friend and supporter of this journal since its inception, died on September 30, 1998, in Claremont, California, at the age of eighty-eight. Born in Natchez, Mississippi, Will was educated at Swarthmore, Oxford (as a Rhodes scholar), and Princeton. After a legendary teaching career spanning nearly fifty years, thirty-four at Pomona College and another fifteen at the California Institute of Technology, (...) Will retired in 1985. He published a host of articles and books, among them the highly regarded five-volume A History of Western Philosophy, now in its fourth edition. Will received numerous awards and honors, including Lippincott, Procter, Ford Faculty, and Guggenheim Fellowships; he was also a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar, and twice a Resident Scholar with the Rockefeller Foundation at Villa Servelloni. In 1969–70, he was President of the American Philosophical Association’s Pacific Division.In 1961, Will joined Karl Aschenbrenner, John D. Goheen, Paul O. Kristeller, Oskar Piest, Benson Mates, Ernest Moody, Richard H. Popkin, Herbert W. Schneider, and E. W. Strong (as chair) to form the Executive Committee (now Board of Directors) of the Journal of the History of Philosophy. The first issue of the JHP appeared some two years later. Will provided much valuable counsel and support in the turbulent early years of the JHP, helping in particular in securing much needed financial support from the Claremont Colleges. We join Will’s family, friends, colleagues, and students in mourning the loss of a fine historian, philosopher, and teacher.Copyright © 1999 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This paper focuses on Horwich's metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, it focuses on Horwich's charge that all philosophy is irrational. First, I coordinate the various aspects of Horwich's metaphilosophical program to make sense of his charge of irrationality against philosophy. Second, I argue that this metaphilosophical program misfires in two distinct ways. However, third, I close by calling attention to what I posit to be a critical insight of Horwich's account.

This paper examines one of the most potent contemporaneous criticisms of the German Enlightenment (circa 1790) as well as the lessons that can be learned from such criticism. Specifically, it examines Kant's famous essay, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,” and Hamman's objection drawn mainly from his “Letter to Christian Jacob Kraus.” It further argues Hamann’s criticisms are foresighted, especially when read against the subsequent dark imperil history of the ‘West' as seen in post-colonial theory.

This paper investigates Kit Fine's account of the nature of material objects – the theory of embodiments.1 This theory is custom-fitted to an intuitive distinction between ‘timeless’ and ‘temporary’ parthood. It incorporates these notions by postulating two operations by which objects can be generated from their (immediate) parts. The operation of ‘rigid embodiment’ generates objects which have their immediate parts timelessly. In contrast, any product of the alternative operation, ‘variable embodiment’, has only temporary material parts. I shall argue that Fine's (...) operations of embodiment cannot account for what I call ‘nucleated wholes’ – objects which have both timeless and temporary immediate parts. As such, the theory of embodiment does not account for a significant class of material things. Having explained the problem, I consider four ways in which Fine's theory might be defended. None of these responses is entirely satisfactory. I conclude by highlighting two ways in which one might continue – either proceeding within Fine's ‘operationalist’ framework, or dropping this and developing an alternative framework. (shrink)

Abstract:Alasdair Maclntyre (1984) asserts that the ethical systems of the Enlightenment (formalism and utilitarianism) have failed to provide a meaningful definition of “good.” Lacking such a definition, business managers have no internal standards by which they can morally evaluate their roles or acts. Maclntyre goes on to claim that managers have substituted external measures of “winning” or “effectiveness” for any internal concept of good. He supports a return to the Aristotelian notion of virtue or “excellence.” Such a system of virtue (...) ethics depends on an interrelationship of the community, one’s roles in that community, and the virtues one needs to perform that role well. This article develops Maclntyre’s concept of virtue ethics and shows how this paradigm fits well with existing theories about organizational behavior. (shrink)